Getting banks, investors and borrowers together to work out a solution that
benefits them all is the most promising idea to emerge since the housing market
first crashed.
We are now in the fifth year of a housing crisis in which more than 3 million
Americans have lost their homes to foreclosure, with millions more still
at risk.
Every initiative — government or private — to stem the tide of misery has
fallen leagues short in the face of continued economic gloom and the
intransigence of lenders.
So it’s an odd moment to be identifying glimmers of optimism that solutions
to the crisis might finally be emerging. Yet that may be the case.
Over the next few weeks, several initiatives aimed at reforming the
foreclosure process, holding mortgage lenders and services accountable for their
past abuses, and creating more effective mortgage workouts are coming to a
head.
They’re moving sometimes along parallel lines and sometimes at
cross-purposes, but they’re moving.
First, some context. The complexity of the foreclosure crisis stems from the
process of bundling hundreds of thousands of mortgage loans into securities
and selling them to investors.
Typically, banks and other lenders retained almost no financial interest in
the mortgages they originated, other than the duty to service them — collect
payments and pursue delinquent borrowers, say — for which they received a
fee.
Several drawbacks to that system emerged when the housing economy crashed.
Because the loans weren’t going to stay on their books, the lenders hadn’t been
too careful about whom they lent to and on what terms.
Ownership of the repackaged loans was dispersed among investors, so it’s hard
to know even today who the owners are or whether their ownership is properly
documented. This has led to further abuses, such as the infamous “robo-signing”
outbreak, in which institutions trying to foreclose on mortgages have submitted
forged documents attesting to their legal right to do so.
Perhaps the biggest problem is that although the servicers, which include
huge banks such as Bank of America and Wells Fargo, are burdened with the
responsibility to renegotiate mortgages to keep borrowers out of foreclosure,
their authority to do so on behalf of investors is murky.
As a result, though the investor, the borrower and the economy in general
benefit if a home is kept out of foreclosure, even if that means its owner makes
lower payments than were required by the original mortgage, the servicing banks
are leery of renegotiating too aggressively.
The most closely followed remedial effort involves the 50 state attorneys
general under the leadership of Iowa Atty. Gen. Tom Miller.
Last March, the group produced a 27-page proposal for foreclosure reforms
that drew fire from some consumer advocates for being too lenient — its
provisions include mandates that banks comply with state law in dealing with
borrowers, as if that’s a novel concept — and from business interests for
putting too much pressure on banks to reduce principal balances for homeowners
having trouble keeping up payments on homes with values that have fallen below
the mortgage balance.
But Miller’s group is under pressure to issue a final proposal around Labor
Day. The longer the settlement talks drag on, some observers say, the harder it
becomes to keep all the participants on board.
Indeed, a key attorney general who has been skeptical of Miller’s approach is
pursuing his own line.
New York’s Eric T. Schneiderman recently took a promising step by filing to
intervene in the proposed legal settlement between Bank of America, which
acquired mortgage king Countrywide Financial, and Bank of New York, which
managed 530 investment trusts that bought packages of Countrywide mortgages.
Schneiderman wants to block the settlement unless it’s improved.
The settlement calls for BofA to pay investors in the trusts $8.5 billion and
to commit to an improved mortgage servicing and modification process, including
giving “individualized attention” to high-risk borrowers aimed at helping them
stay in their homes.
Among the deal’s flaws, according to Schneiderman’s motion, is that the
payment is too low and the settlement indemnifies Bank of New York against
further claims for fraud in its handling of the trusts. Schneiderman says the
bank, which he contends is guilty of numerous violations of state law, had a
conflict of interest in cutting a deal that let itself off the hook. (The New
York state judge overseeing the BofA settlement talks with Bank of New York
hasn’t yet ruled on Schneiderman’s motion.) Several investors have also objected
that the two banks made the settlement privately and secretly.
Despite its shortcomings, the proposal settlement does provide a possible
framework for solving the foreclosure crisis by giving all parties something
they want: Borrowers get efforts at loan modifications from their banks, in
return for which the banks and investors would get the borrowers’ acknowledgment
that they’re owed the money. Fewer foreclosures, more loan modifications and an
end to robo-signing — in the housing world, that’s nirvana.
Schneiderman has some pretty heavy artillery to bring to the battlefield.
Most of the trusts subject to the proposed settlement fall under the
jurisdiction of New York law (the rest come under the law of Delaware, whose
attorney general, Beau Biden, is working with Schneiderman). As my colleagues
Nathaniel Popper and Alejandro Lazo reported last month, the standard for fraud
claims under New York law is less stringent than under federal law.
A third driver of solutions to the foreclosure crisis is investigations by
individual states into foreclosure abuses. California, where nearly 800,000
homes have been lost to foreclosure since 2006, according to the property
information service DataQuick, and tens of thousands more might fall in the next
year, is ground zero of the foreclosure crisis.
Atty. Gen. Kamala Harris has been playing both sides of the fence; she has
met with Schneiderman to discuss cooperating in his investigation of
securitization fraud, but is also watching the 50-state effort to see if it
produces “accountability and results” for California borrowers. Read that as: a
cash settlement commensurate with the pain caused to Californians by foreclosure
abuses, and real reform. The louder that states like California threaten
investigations, the more inclined banks may be to agree to reform.
It’s still unclear how each of these initiatives will influence the others,
or indeed if any of them will result in relief for strapped and defrauded
homeowners. Bankers have been perfectly candid about their power to draw out the
legal process indefinitely if they choose: Bank of New York has defended its
proposed $8.5-billion settlement with Bank of America in court by warning that
the alternative is “litigation …over the course of several years.”
It warns that there might be legal questions over whether Bank of America,
which acquired Countrywide in 2008, could be forced to cover judgments against
the latter. Without BofA’s deep pockets, it’s hinted, there won’t be money for
anyone.
The one incontrovertible fact about the foreclosure crisis is that voluntary
loan modification efforts, whether they’re conducted under the sponsorship of
the government’s Home Affordable Modification Program or the mortgage industry,
haven’t helped more than a handful of affected borrowers.
Bringing the banks, investors and borrowers to the same table to work out a
solution that benefits them all is the most promising idea to emerge since the
housing market first crashed. Why has it taken so long to get there?
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